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Hypotheses on Islam and Large-Scale Political Violence
In Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu (1995) 
The gentleness so recommended in the gospel stands opposed to the despotic fury with which a prince would mete out his own justice and exercise his cruelties. . . . The Mohammedan religion, which speaks only with a sword, continues to act on men with the destructive spirit that founded it. (pp. 461-462) A quarter of a millennium later, in one of the most globally influential works of social science of the late 20th century, Samuel Huntington (1996) similarly asserted that Islamic societies are especially prone to large-scale political violence. Huntington discussed both "intercivilizational" and "intracivilizational" violence. By the former, he meant conflict between Islamic and nonIslamic countries; by the latter, he meant conflict within countries. Huntington saw both kinds of strife as especially acute among Muslims. He not only asserted that "Islam's borders are bloody" but added "and so are its innards" (pp. 256-258) .
Its innards are what concern us here. Armed conflict between Islamic and non-Islamic countries lies outside our purview. Assessing responsibility for who initiated (or is to blame for) interstate wars is a thorny issue but one that must be addressed if the analyst seeks to assess whether the people of this or that confession or region-or, for that matter, people living under one or another type of political regime-are more or less prone to go to war with other countries. Such matters are best left to specialists in international relations. Here we stick with assessment of whether the internal politics of predominantly Muslim countries are unusually bloody.
The notion that Islam is conducive to mass political violence is based on a claim about the way Muslims understand jihad, or holy struggle. Jihad has multiple meanings and manifestations. Recent scholarly works have provided sophisticated treatments (Bonner, 2008; Bonney, 2004; Cook, 2005; Kelsay, 2007) . One meaning of jihad is armed struggle. Some people, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, read passages of the Koran as condoning violence against the enemies of Islam. Many contemporary observers regard the notion of violent jihad as very much alive among contemporary Muslims. The notion of holy war is not foreign to Christianity, whose Crusader armies struggled mightily (if unsuccessfully) to recover the Holy Land during the 11th and 12th centuries. Nor is it alien to other religious traditions. But neither contemporary
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Christianity nor any other modern major world religion has a concept of jihad-at least not one that is as central to its doctrine as jihad is to Islam. If some modern Muslims take to heart what they perceive as permission-even a prescription-to commit violence, one might expect large-scale political violence to be especially high among Muslims. The religion's perceived enemies may include non-Muslims, Muslims who collaborate with non-Muslims, Muslims who are viewed as lacking in piety, and Muslims who are seen as enforcing a political order that harms the faith. If the concept of jihad has sharp teeth, we might expect large-scale political violence to be more frequent and acute in societies with larger Muslim populations.
The empirical evidence on contemporary terrorism may reinforce an expectation of a positive association between Islam and large-scale political violence. Over the past several decades, a large portion of what are normally defined in the West as terrorist acts have been committed by Muslims in the name of Islam. If patterns of large-scale, sustained political violence mimic those of terrorist acts, one would expect the former to be unusually common and severe in predominantly Muslim societies.
The counterhypothesis is that Islam may help inoculate societies against mass political violence. Some writers claim that the vast majority of Muslims understand jihad in nonviolent terms and that the prevalence of the idea of jihad among Muslims is no spur to violence (Al-Ghannouchi, 2000; Lawrence, 2000; Lukens-Bull, 2005) . It may even promote personal discipline and social solidarity in a manner that cuts the risk of bloodshed (Adler, 1983) .
The expectation of a negative association between Islam and largescale political violence may find support in the data on violent crime. Homicide rates tend to be low in predominantly Islamic countries. In fact, the proportion of society that is made up of Muslims provides a good predictor of cross-national variation in murder rates (Helal & Coston, 1995; Neapolitan, 1997; Souryal, 1987) . If patterns of bloodshed arising from mass political violence look anything like patterns of criminal violence, one might expect less carnage from mass political strife in lands in which Muslims predominate.
These hypotheses may guide our inquiry, but there is no body of literature that actually tests them. Despite enormous interest in Islam and violence around the world, there have been surprisingly few efforts to assess empirically whether Muslims are especially prone to large-scale political violence. Assertions and commentary abound, but empirical tests are virtually nonexistent. The findings offered below may provide a starting point for bringing hard evidence to bear on questions that are of great significance and public interest.
Measuring Large-Scale Political Violence
There are several sources of data on large-scale political violence in the world. The compilation authored and regularly updated by Marshall (2008) stands out for its comprehensiveness and quality. Marshall's "Major Episodes of Political Violence" data set provides a complete list of events in the postwar period that produced 500 or more deaths. A recently updated version covers the period 1946-2007, and we rely on this version here.
According to Marshall, during the period under consideration there were 326 episodes of large-scale political violence. Some of these events were international (meaning interstate) in character; others were domestic. We are concerned with domestic (meaning intrastate) conflict. We exclude international conflicts, which include independence struggles against foreign (often colonial) domination. Marshall helpfully includes his own coding of types of conflict, which facilitates distinguishing between interstate and intrastate violence.
Most episodes-235 to be exact-were domestic (intrastate) in nature. This is the universe of cases we examine here. A complete list of these episodes, including the relevant data about them used in this article, is found in Appendix A.
From this list, we may extract several valuable pieces of data. One is how many episodes occurred in Islamic countries and how many took place elsewhere. These numbers provide only a starting point, however. The severity of the episodes varies widely, and we need to consider the toll each episode took in terms of human life. Marshall provides estimates on the number of deaths that each episode produced. His figures are necessarily rough and round because we lack precise body counts for many civil conflagrations.
Muslims and Large-Scale Political Violence
We aim to assess how much mass political violence has occurred among Muslims compared to among people of other creeds. First, let us have a look at the raw numbers.
We may start with a rudimentary classification of the world's countries and examination of the distribution of conflicts. Of the 171 countries in the world with populations of 250,000 or more inhabitants, 43 (25%) are predominantly Muslim.
1 Now, of the 235 major episodes of intrastate political violence, 76 (32%) happened in Islamic countries. Thus, Islamic countries have experienced a mildly disproportionate share of episodes.
We can cut into the data more deeply by looking at lives lost. If we sum up the body count in all 235 major episodes of political violence, the (sobering and stunning) statistic is 21,011,400. Of these, 5,586,150 people, or 27% of the total, perished in Islamic countries. So 27% of the loss of life in major episodes of political violence occurred in the 25% of the world's countries that are predominantly Islamic. Table 1 summarizes the numbers.  Table 2 presents the average number of events per country among Islamic and non-Islamic countries, the average number of deaths per country, and the average number of deaths as a percentage of the country's population in 1990. The last column in Table 2 presents the p value for a permutation t test between the average values in the Islamic and non-Islamic countries for each of the entries. The information in the third row of Table 2 is of particular interest. It represents the average percentage of the national population killed in Islamic and non-Islamic countries. These figures give us an idea of what proportion of each country's people was consumed in political conflagrations. In Muslim countries, on average, 0.65% of the population perished in major political violence. In non-Muslim countries, the analogous figure is 0.72%. Thus, Muslim countries have, on average, suffered slightly less severely from loss of life in major episodes of political violence than have non-Muslim countries. Examining the data in Table 2 shows that although the number of events per country in Islamic countries is on average slightly higher than in nonIslamic countries, there have been fewer deaths as a proportion of the population related to political violence in Islamic countries than in non-Islamic countries. Yet none of the differences is statistically significant. In Figure 1 , we present a graphical representation of how the number of events, the total number of deaths, and the number of deaths as percentage of the population of the country in 1990 are associated with the proportion of Muslims in a population. As can be seen in the plots, dividing the sample into Islamic and non-Islamic countries is quite arbitrary because there is no clear clustering at high or low levels of percentage Muslims in the population. In the analysis below we therefore choose to use as a variable the proportion of Muslims in a population rather than dividing the world into Islamic and non-Islamic countries as was done in the tables above.
Several other facts are worthy of note. It is apparent from the plots that there are some extreme outliers in the data at both high and low levels of Muslims in the population. An overwhelming amount of the carnage took place in a fairly small set of countries. Roughly three quarters of all deaths occurred in just nine countries. In descending order of the number of deaths, those countries are China, Vietnam, Sudan, Cambodia, the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly called Zaire), Korea (North and South, mostly during the war of the early 1950s), Pakistan, Angola, and Afghanistan. Three of those countries are predominantly Muslim (Sudan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan), two are predominantly Christian (the DRC and Angola), and in four neither Christianity nor Islam predominates (China, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Korea) . When we consider total deaths as a percentage of the population, the worst-off countries again represent a mélange of religious traditions. In 12 countries, 3% or more of the national population died in large-scale political violence. In descending order of percentage that perished, those countries are Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Rwanda, Sudan, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the DRC, Burundi, Mozambique, Korea, and Vietnam. These are the countries that, in proportional terms, suffered the most severely. Three are predominantly Islamic (Sudan, Afghanistan, and Bosnia) and five predominantly Christian (Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Rwanda, the DRC, and Burundi). The other four (Cambodia, Mozambique, Korea, and Vietnam) are neither predominately Muslim nor predominantly Christian.
To assess whether there is a link between Islam and mass political violence, we need analyses that control for the other differences between Islamic and non-Islamic countries that might be driving the difference in means that we observe. 3 We run statistical models to try to approximate a conditional mean of the number of deaths for different percentages of Muslims in the population. 4 We measure Islam as the percentage of the population that is made up of Muslims (Association of Religion Data Archives, 2008). Here we encounter a potential temporal problem in the data. Our data on percentage Muslim are drawn from a survey of conditions in recent decades, and our dependent variable, mass political violence, covers episodes reaching back to 1946. We do not have good cross-national data on religious composition of countries in 1946, however, so we must rely on the data we have for later years. Yet doing so probably causes little distortion because the religious composition of societies changes slowly if at all, and the correlation between conditions in, say, 1950 and 1990 is probably very high. Thus, we use the data for more recent decades as a proxy for conditions throughout the postwar period, while bearing in mind that the data are imperfect.
One of the main possible confounders in the study of political violence is socioeconomic development. We might expect richer countries to be less conflict prone than poorer countries. Where want is more widespread, mass violence may be more likely. Ethnic fractionalization may also be of importance. Higher fractionalization may be conducive to greater intercommunal tension and more mass political violence. Socioeconomic inequality may threaten civil peace as well. We would hypothesize that higher inequality would be associated with more violence. The level of democracy might also exert influence. Here the effect could cut either way. More open government might furnish channels for the peaceful resolution of differences among groups and thereby reduce the risk of large-scale violence. But a counterhypothesis is also plausible. Authoritarian regimes, by virtue of their greater harshness and commitment to imposed stability, may be better than democracies at staving off mass political violence. The robustness of the state apparatus is another potentially important variable. Many analysts hold that weak states are far more vulnerable to mass political violence than stronger ones. This is by no means a complete set of possible predictors of large-scale intrastate violence. But it does cover many of what have often been considered the main explanatory variables. Finding data even for the variables outlined here is difficult, however. The main problem is that we are examining events that cover a substantial period of time (about 60 years, starting with the first year after the end of World War II). It would be ideal to have data for each country for our control variables for 1946, which we could treat as the starting point of the period, or for each year starting from 1945 or 1946, which might allow for time-series analysis. But we lack such data. We lack good information on level of socioeconomic development, measured as income per capita and life expectancy, for the early postwar years. We have some numbers, but prior to the 1970s data for many countries are missing and what we have are often of dubious reliability. The further we move back in history, the less plentiful the data become. Even the most complete sources lack data for many countries for GDP (or income) per capita, fertility rate, life expectancy, infant mortality, and the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture.
5 Our best hope is to rely on data on fertility rates for a midpoint in the interval of time we are considering. Here we measure socioeconomic development as total fertility rate (births per woman) from 1970 to 1975, as reported by the United Nations Development Programme in a recent report. 6 Lower fertility rates indicate higher socioeconomic development. Thus, if higher levels of development promote civil peace, we would expect to find a positive relationship between fertility rates and deaths per capita in large-scale political violence.
We lack data on ethnic fractionalization specifically for the immediate postwar period. But because ethnic composition is relatively stable, we may consider the numbers we have to be acceptable estimates of conditions throughout the postwar years (Alesina, Easterly, Devleeschauwer, Kurlat, & Warcziarg, 2002) . We would expect greater fractionalization to cause more political violence.
Data on socioeconomic inequality, which is measured using the Gini index, are too sparse and unreliable for decades preceding the 1990s to be used here. This variable we must omit.
We do have some data for the openness of political regime, and we use those scores here. Freedom House ratings began appearing only in the mid-1970s. Here we use data for Freedom House scores in 1975 (Freedom House, 2008 . (11) score in that same year; for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Czechoslovakia's score in that year. 8 Including a control for the robustness of the state apparatus, which may affect the risk of large-scale political violence, would be desirable, but it is not practicable. We have several good sources of quantitative data based on expert surveys, but they apply only to the past decade or so (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2008; Marshall & Cole, 2008) . We may, however, use a dichotomous variable for when countries received their independence. Countries that did not enjoy independent statehood as of the beginning of the previous century may be more likely to have weak state structures than those that obtained statehood earlier. Countries that were not independent by the year 1900 include those that were constituents of empires and that were under colonial rule. Here we control for that factor using a dichotomous (dummy) variable, with 1 standing for countries whose history of independent statehood postdates the beginning of the 20th century and 0 for those that did enjoy independent statehood before 1900. If late national independence is associated with weaker state structures and thus with a higher propensity to suffer large-scale political violence over the past six decades, we would expect a positive relationship between the dummy variable for late statehood and deaths because of political violence.
If we were attempting definitively to assess the causes of large-scale political violence, the data available to us and the methods we use would be inadequate. But we have no such pretension. We seek only to ascertain the correlation between a single factor, the Muslim proportion of the population, and mass political violence. The other regressors are merely controls. Thus, the shortage of stellar data need not derail our investigation.
Deaths as a percentage of the population in major episodes of political violence constitutes our outcome variable. If Muslims are more prone to mass political violence, we should see a positive relationship between percentage of the population made up of Muslims and the outcome variable; if Muslims are less prone to mass political violence, the relationship should be negative. Table 3 shows the results of the statistical analyses.
We rely on negative binomial regression, which is commonly used to estimate count models in which many cases have very low scores on the dependent variable. 9 In the negative binomial models presented in Tables 3 and 4 , the coefficients are log odds ratios. The variable of interest is the percentage Muslims in the country. As Table 3 shows, the coefficient for this variable is weakly negative, indicating that countries with a higher percentage of Muslims have slightly lower levels of large-scale political violence even when we control for other variables. The coefficient is not, however, statistically significant at conventional levels.
The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is a goodness-of-fit measure for which the smallest value suggests the best fit. The diminutive differences in the AIC across models indicate that adding in more variables does not substantially bolster our ability to explain the outcome variable. The models generally have a poor fit, suggesting that something other than all of these variables, including the percentage Muslims in a population, may drive variation in the number of deaths by political violence. Yet it bears note that both development and democracy are statistically significant. More poverty (shown by higher fertility rates) and less democracy (indicated by lower inverted Freedom House scores) are associated with more carnage.
As was clear in Figure 1 above, although most countries had no or a very small portion of the population destroyed in episodes of large-scale political violence, a few countries have very high numbers. To what extent are these outliers driving the results? In Table 4 we run the same models as in Table 3 but exclude the six countries with the highest number of deaths per capita: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, and Sudan. These countries were selected because they have values higher than the 97th percentile on the variable for percentage of the national population that perished in episodes of large-scale political violence. As we can see in Table 4 , excluding the extreme cases does not dramatically change the results. The proportion of Muslims still has a weak, negative coefficient that is not statistically significant. 1338
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We may graphically illustrate the model's estimate of the relationship between percentage Muslim and predicted percentage of the population killed in major episodes of political violence. Figure 2 shows the estimated relationships. The left-hand plot shows the association between the percentage Muslims in a country and the predicted percentage of the population that died because of mass political violence from 1946 to 2007. The prediction is based on Model 3 presented in Table 3 , holding fertility rate and level of democracy to their mean value and late national independence to 1. Moving from being 0% Muslim to 100% Muslim is associated with a 0.32 percentage point reduction in the predicted proportion of the population killed in episodes of large-scale political violence. Yet, as is reported in Table 3 , this reduction is not statistically significant. We cannot be confident that there is actually a systematic difference in levels of violence between countries with larger and smaller Muslim populations. The righthand plot shows the relationship without outliers, as predicted by Model 3 in Table 4 . Moving from a country with 0% to 100% Muslims is associated with a 0.18 percentage point reduction in the proportion of the population destroyed in mass political violence, but again this reduction is not statistically distinguishable from 0. Negative binomial models with robust standard errors in parentheses. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
To sum up the findings of this section, we find some evidence that Muslims are less inclined to large-scale political violence than non-Muslims, but the difference is small and not statistically distinguishable from zero. The soundest conclusion we can draw is that we find no evidence that Muslims are more inclined than non-Muslims to large-scale political violence.
Islamism and Large-Scale Political Violence
So far we have examined the relationship between Muslims and mass political violence. But what about the impact of radical Islamism, as opposed to Muslims? Above, we found that countries with larger shares of Muslims in the population do not have higher death rates from mass political violence. But it still is possible that Islamists are responsible for a grossly disproportionate amount of the world's mass political violence. Radical Islamism is a potent ideology-or, rather, multiplicity of ideologies-whose adherents are sometimes inclined to force. Even if most Muslims disapprove of Islamist ideologies and violent methods, and even if, as shown above, Muslim lands are not disproportionately afflicted by large-scale political violence, it is possible that Islamists, as bearers of a distinct cause or ideology, may be responsible for an inordinate amount of mass political violence.
The findings of some writers might lead one to such a conclusion. Monica Duffy Toft (2007) (11) were involved in a far greater percentage of wars than were governments and rebels who identified with other religions. Toft explains her finding in terms of numerous factors, including the historical absence in the Islamic world of an internecine religious war analogous to Europe's Thirty Years' War in the 17th century, the spatial proximity of Islam's holiest sites to Israel and to large oil reserves, and the concept of jihad. Toft's findings may help explain why Islamists are more frequently involved in religious civil wars than are partisans of other religions. Our main question and our data, however, differ from Toft's. She focuses specifically on religious wars, whereas we examine all large-scale episodes of political violence and ask when Islamists had a role in making those conflicts.
To answer the question, we have coded all episodes of large-scale political violence in terms of whether or not Islamists were involved in instigating the conflict. In making this judgment, we relied on press reports, secondary sources, and personal communication with country specialists. We identified Islamists in terms of actors' self-identification as well as the way they are perceived by governments and observers. Assessing whether or not Islamists were culpable is, for the vast majority of cases, unproblematic. Little sleuthing is required. Most of the episodes are protracted conflicts whose perpetrators operated openly and whose identities are not difficult to establish.
In some cases coding required judgment calls. For example, the war in Chechnya in the 1990s pitted insurgents from a largely Muslim region against the central government in a largely Christian society. But the initiators of the conflict were ethnonationalists who sought separation from Russia; they were not Islamists. The insurgents subsequently attracted funding from the likes of Saudi Arabia, and their struggle became something of a cause célèbre among Islamists abroad. Some of the insurgents themselves, moreover, eventually took up the banner of Islam. At the time of the war's initiation, however, the insurgents were almost uniformly nominal Muslims who neither identified themselves nor were identified by the Russian or other governments as Islamists. We therefore code this conflict as not having been instigated by Islamists. The civil war of the 1990s in Tajikistan, by contrast, we code as having Islamist perpetrators. Some observers regard the protagonists in this war largely as rival clans and regional elites, not as militant religionists, and do not regard Islamists as responsible for the war's initiation. Yet because some forces that clearly identified themselves as Islamists were involved in the onset of the war, we code the conflict as having been instigated by Islamists (Heathershaw, 2009; Hughes, 2008; Lieven, 1999; Jonson, 2006) .
To ensure transparency, we present the coding in the table presented in Appendix A. We ask whether or not the conflict was "instigated in whole or in part by Islamists." The answer (yes or no) is presented in the right-most column of the table.
Cases are coded yes even if Islamists were only partially responsible. Sometimes Islamists were only one of several instigators, and perhaps not the main one. For example, the genocide against communists and ethnic Chinese that took place as the Suharto regime consolidated power in Indonesia in 1965-1966 is coded as yes even though Islamists were only one of several culprits. In this case, Islamists were arguably more tools of Suharto's-decidedly secularist-military than prime movers. In another genre of episode, Islamists were partially involved in instigation of violence but did more dying than killing. Thus, Islamists are coded as being "in whole or in part" responsible for the instigation of the civil violence that took 2,000 lives in Egypt from 1992 to 1999, though agents of the secularist government may have killed more of their Islamist foes than the other way around.
Of the 235 major episodes of intrastate political violence, Islamists participated in instigating 27, or 11% of the total. Of the 21,011,400 deaths causes by all episodes, 3,402,700, or 16%, occurred in the episodes in which Islamists were involved in instigation. Table 5 summarizes the numbers.
We may compare the numbers on Islamist-instigated violence to those on episodes that actors other than Islamists instigated. The brief accounts provided in the "description" column in Appendix A contain the needed information. Ten episodes (4% of the global total), accounting for 3,069,020 deaths (15% of the global total), occurred in China and Taiwan in revolutionary and postrevolutionary hostilities stemming from the Chinese Communist Party's coming to and holding of power. These episodes exacted approximately the same number of deaths as all episodes in which Islamists were wholly or partly responsible for the instigation of conflict. A total of 26 episodes (11% of the total), accounting for 3,830,300 deaths (18% of the total), occurred in the six Middle and East African nations of Angola, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC or Zaire, Rwanda, and Uganda. Government forces and partisans of rival ethnic groups bear responsibility for these conflicts, whose frequency and death toll were roughly equivalent to those of the conflicts in which Islamists bore some responsibility. None of these countries is primarily Islamic, nor were the instigators of any of these conflicts Islamists. Is Islamist-instigated conflict responsible for a disproportionate amount of violence? Are the 11% of episodes and 16% of deaths for which Islamists bear some responsibility a grossly disproportionate amount or not? Here the reader must make his or her own judgment. We simply have no base rate or objective standard against which to judge. Our assessments are further complicated when we consider that some of the conflicts that Islamists participated in igniting were also instigated by other actors who bear joint responsibility. Indeed, in some of the episodes that we code as Islamist instigated, Islamists were only one of several initiators of the conflict, and in some cases they were not necessarily either the leading initiators of the conflict or the main culprits for bloodletting during the course of the episode. All we can say with certainty is that Islamists do bear some responsibility for major episodes of political violence in the postwar world but that some other actors have been responsible for as much large-scale political violence as Islamists have.
Conclusion
Large-scale political violence is not disproportionately common or deadly in Muslim lands. When we control for possible confounding variables in regressions that treat countries as units of analysis, a higher percentage of Muslims is actually associated with a bit less carnage in major episodes of intrastate political violence. But the effect is small and tenuous; the empirical evidence does not allow us to conclude that Muslims are less prone than nonMuslims to political violence. All we can say for sure is that we turn up no evidence that countries with a larger share of Muslims have experienced a disproportionate share of carnage in political strife in the postwar period. Our finding of a nonrelationship contradicts portrayals of Muslim lands as disproportionately afflicted by large-scale civil conflict.
Whether Islamists are responsible for an inordinate amount of the world's large-scale political violence is a separate question. It is difficult to answer. Whether the share of conflicts that Islamists had a hand in initiating is disproportionate or not is in the eye of the observer. Islamists bore some responsibility for 11% of major episodes of political violence, which account for 16% of deaths. In the view of the authors, these numbers are not negligible, but neither are they overwhelming. Non-Islamist actors, such as revolutionary forces in China and partisans of interethnic struggles in Middle and East Africa, had a hand in instigating roughly as much strife and loss of life as Islamists did. Islamism has indeed been a wellspring of large-scale political violence in the postwar world, but it has been only one of numerous such sources. Poisson models, binomial models, and negative binomial models are the most commonly used models for studying count data. These models generally, and in this case specifically, give a much better model fit than the ordinary least squares (OLS) models because the normality assumption underlying an OLS model usually is violated when using count data. Count data have a lower bound of zero and no upper bound and are seldom normally distributed. Poisson models make an assumption that the mean and the variance in the distribution are the same, whereas negative binomial models are often recommended for overdispersed data. Overdispersion in the data can arise when the occurrence of one event increases the probability of further events, as is the case in the political violence data. See Hilbe (2008) . We nevertheless also conducted the analyses using standard OLS models, specified as they are here in Tables 3 and 4 . The output is presented in Appendix B. In the OLS models we see a negative and significant coefficient for percentage Muslims in the population. The model fit is very poor, however, and it is hard to draw conclusions from these findings. 10. Because the standard errors of the coefficients remain almost the same across the different specifications, we have no reason to believe that there is a multicollinearity problem driving the results in these models. We also tested for multicollinearity by examining the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the variables in the models presented in Tables 3 and 4 . Because all VIFs are less than 2, we have no reason to believe that we have a major problem with multicollinearity. See Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) .
